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One of the main weaknesses of the critiques of education policies in post-apartheid South Africa is the tendency to overlook the ana lysis
of the new state and th e limitations  imposed on it by th e Interim  Constitu tion. As such, critiques of policy have been framed in terms of
literary or documentary analysis,  i.e. by looking at the policy texts that have been released by government since the establish m ent of  the
new dispensation. This article represents an attempt to move beyond this narrow analysis of policy and the policy process in the education
arena to scrutinise the complex dynamics that have determined or at least conditioned particular directions and mad e particular policy
practices prevail. In particular, it looks at the cha llenges of restru cturing the  aparthe id education departm ents, the challenges of the
coexistence of the old and the new  bureaucracy in the new  Dep artment of Ed ucation (DoE ) and the im pact this has had on  the establishment
of the new institutional mem ory and culture within the DoE in South Africa.
Introduction
The aim of this article is to analyse and assess the challenges encoun-
tered in the establishment of the new Department of Education (DoE),
particularly the new bureaucracy as an organ of state in order, to ex-
plain the complexity of the state formation and policy development in
post-apartheid South Africa. In its early days in office, the new Minis-
try of Education was hard-pressed in terms of human resources to cope
with the challenges at hand, and therefore had to make certain choices
to defer some of the responsibilities until enough capacity was built to
deal with the challenges at hand. Policy development should therefore
not only be viewed in terms of texts, consultation and participation,
but also in terms of the totality of the challenges faced by the Ministry
of Education and their responsibilities in getting education functional.
This article looks particularly at challenges of restructuring apartheid
education departments and employment of new staff. 
In explaining the challenges and pressures under which this took
place, and the need to formulate new policies, Du Preez, who acted as
the Director-General of education during the first four months of the
new government, equates the challenges involved with 'changing the
wheel of the car whilst the car was moving'(Du Preez, interview).
Once the new Department was established, it drove education policies
and the restructuring process. The establishment of the new DoE in-
volved interrelated challenges. 
These challenges included firstly, the integration and restruc-
turing of the former national department of education; secondly, the
integration and restructuring of former provincial education depart-
ments; and thirdly, the development of instruments (legislation) to
enable the new structures to work. The article argues that the esta-
blishment of the DoE was an attempt to shift from impenetrable polity,
as represented by the continued existence of the old apartheid edu-
cation departments and their personnel (until they were disesta-
blished), to accessible polity as represented by the appointment of a
Strategic Management Team (SMT) followed by other new appoint-
ments. that was aimed at overcoming the constraints of the Interim
Constitution. The article deals with the following issues: firstly,
Archer's theory of educational change; secondly, the inheritance of the
old apartheid education departments and its impact on the creation of
the DoE and the new bureaucracy; and thirdly, the challenge of cre-
ating the new institutional culture and its impact on policy develop-
ment and implementation. 
Method
This article draws from the larger research that was conducted for a
doctoral research project submitted to the School of Education at the
University of the Witwatersrand. It relies on the qualitative research
method using interviews and documentary analysis. With respect to
the interviews, the article draws from the voices of key government
officials who were driving the restructuring process during the early
days of the government coming into power. These interviews were
carefully selected from over 60 interviews conducted for the doctoral
study. These selected interviews present the inner perspectives of the
working and thinking within the DoE during the first two years of the
new government. They also speak to the contending views within go-
vernment in terms of what was seen as crucial to the restructuring pro-
cess. As such, this article represents a unique opportunity to hear the
voices of key government officials in terms of how they saw the re-
structuring process unfolding. Open-ended questions were used during
the interviews with the aim of allowing respondents to speak openly
about their experiences and perceptions of how the restructuring
process was unfolding. Whilst the selection of interviews could have
been wider, only a few were deliberately chosen here as the focus is
on depth rather than broad coverage. As such, the reliability and
validity of the data are not based on how frequently the views expres-
sed are supported, but on seniority and the roles each interviewee
played in the restructuring process. Given the political roles the
interviewees played within the DoE, their perspectives will obviously
be clouded by politics. However, this should not be seen as a weak-
ness, but as providing a perspective on some of the forces influencing
policy development and its implementation and, in the context of this
article, restructuring in education. The analysis in this article in loca-
ted within Archer's theory of educational change and its features of
impenetrable polity and accessible polity.
Discussion
Archer's theory of educational change
Archer sees change in education systems as the consequence of pur-
poseful action by contending social groups. In other words, education
is a site of struggle. She argues that: 
Education has the characteristics it does (at any given time)
because of the goals pursued by those who control it ... change
occurs because new goals are pursued by those who have the
power to modify education's previous structural form, definition
of instruction and relationship to society ... education is funda-
mentally about what people have of it and have been able to do
of it (Archer, 1979:1).
She adds that education is rarely, if ever, the practical realisation of an
ideal form of instruction as envisaged by a particular group. Instead,
the forms education takes are usually the political products of power
struggles. They bear the marks of concessions to allies and compro-
mises with opponents (ibid:2). 
Once a state education system is established, the degree of cen-
tralisation and decentralisation becomes of key importance in deter-
mining strategies for changing it. In highly centralised education sys-
tems, negotiated education change typically occurs in one way — by
political manipulation at the national level. All demands have to be
channelled through the political system. Nevertheless, the patterns of
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change vary depending on the nature of the polity controlling the
centralised decision system. Archer distinguishes between three types
of polity: impenetrable, semi-permeable and politically accessible
(ibid:3). This article will only concentrate on features of impenetrable
polity and accessible polity. 
Features of impenetrable (inaccessible) polity
The following are the features of impenetrable polity:
• In impenetrable (inaccessible) polity, no organised, united, edu-
cational opposition emerges, partly owing to the social and ideo-
logical heterogeneity in opposition groups and partly as a result
of state strategies. When education change is permitted, it is of
the 'top-down' variety. Academics and teachers are confined to
consultative roles and parents and external groups are deliberate-
ly kept peripheral. Teachers will use any freedom of action they
achieve to advance their vested professional interests rather than
to effect systems change. Where national associations are formed
they pursue policies to obstruct the implementation of these chan-
ges (ibid:236). The social heterogeneity of those who are satis-
fied with current education discourages the development of
strong opposition to official educational policy; simultaneously;
the polity actively seeks to prevent the formation of organisations
committed to educational reform.
• The contribution of professional and external interest groups to
shaping educational policy is at its lowest when an impenetrable
polity coincides with the presence of united governing elites. The
former cannot even play a systematic negative role by engaging
in a concerted policy of obstruction (ibid:236). 
These features may be related to the apartheid education system where
government maintained tight control and would not tolerate any form
of dissent. Whilst this might be true of the societies Archer used in de-
veloping her theory that in the impenetrable (inaccessible) polity no
organised, united, educational opposition emerges, this does not hold
true for the South African educational experience under apartheid.
Contrary to the assertion that in centrally controlled systems teachers
would pursue their professional interests only, teachers moved their
struggle beyond professional interests by linking it to broader political
struggles that were aimed at transforming the whole education system.
In the process a strong opposition to official education policy emerged
with the establishment of teacher unions and other education organisa-
tions committed to change. In South Africa, educational organisations
committed to the eradication of apartheid were organised under the
National Education Coordinating Committee (NECC). This brought
together parents, teachers, students and community education organi-
sations in a formidable opposition. The NECC attempted to shape edu-
cation policy with the development of people's education curriculum
materials. The project was aborted as a result of state repression.
The teachers' struggle for the eradication of apartheid education
and the democratisation of the education system received a boost with
the establishment of the South African Democratic Teachers Union
(SADTU), which developed from an amalgamation of different tea-
cher organisations. As Allais and McKay put it, this organisation
effected a marked change in teacher politics, which had historically
been fragmented. The formation of SADTU intensified and accelera-
ted teacher politics — in particular the wave of 'chalk down' strikes
(where teachers refused to teach), protest marches, rallies and pickets
by teachers (McKay, 1995). In the university sector, the establishment
of the Union of Democratic University Staff Associations (UDUSA)
in the late 1980s was to fight for the rights of academics, including the
protection of academic freedom under apartheid. The struggle was
changed into the transformation agenda in the 1990s prior to the 1994
elections. Archer's theory of educational change as expressed in inac-
cessible polity fails to take account of these features. However, her
theory holds true for the way in which power in the apartheid edu-
cation system came to be centralised in the hands of a white governing
elite. 
The dawn of democracy led to the formal dissolution of some of
these apartheid education structures but not their disappearance. The
dislodging of these structures was what came to characterise the esta-
blishment of the new DoE. The challenges of and the struggle for dis-
mantling the apartheid education system for a democratic education
social order was simultaneously a struggle for the establishment of an
accessible polity that would allow the participation of different stake-
holders. 
Features of accessible polity
Archer identifies the following as features of accessible polity:
• The existence of accessible polity allows a wide range of educa-
tion demands to reach the central decision-making arena and
many groups may work through the system of parliamentary
coalitions in seeking to negotiate their demands.
• The extreme disunity of elite relations in accessible polity pre-
vents the consolidation of stable units for political manipulation
(parties, alliances and coalitions) and leads to legislative immobi-
lisation.
• The combination of an accessible polity with heterogeneous go-
verning elites not only encourages the mobilisation of interested
groups, but also places a premium on large, well-organised
national associations. However, when interest groups themselves
are also divided and incapable of cooperation it prevents the for-
mation of stable associations with consistent political sponsor-
ship. The disunity of governing elites and of education interest
groups together amplifies the negative effects these have on one
another (Archer, 1979:335-356).
The struggle for democracy in South Africa was also a struggle for the
participation by the majority of the people in decisions that affected
them. Hence the slogan of the Freedom Charter 'the people shall
govern'. Given the historical role civil society played in the unfolding
of democracy, it became difficult for the new government to ignore it.
As a result, the partnership between the liberation movement and civil
society continued even after the election of the new government in
1994. In highlighting the importance of the participation of stake-
holders in the policy process, Manganyi commented that: 
Public participation is the way the (mass) democratic movement
(in South Africa) does things. The struggle was about many
things but it was also about public participation in influencing
decisions that affect people's lives. Quite apart from the fact that
we are a constitutional state, any attempt to operate differently
would in a sense be a betrayal of some of the values that have
been paramount in the history of the struggle in this country.
Apart from formal considerations that relate to the kind of consti-
tution that we have, a parliamentary system that works in a cer-
tain way, we have a government that believes in accountability
and transparency. How would we become transparent if there was
no public participation? (Manganyi, interview).
The principle of public participation laid the basis for the struggle to
establish align accessible polity with the features outlined above. This
article shows, however, that even though the government of national
unity (GNU) arrangement at legislative level appeared to be showing
features of accessible polity because of the 'inclusive' way in which it
was constituted, at the executive level it showed some elements of
impenetrable polity as the apartheid bureaucracy and the institutional
culture remained intact. The challenges inherent in the establishment
of the new DoE were also about the struggle to dismantle the strangle-
hold of the apartheid system on the DoE and to establish a new insti-
tutional culture and practices in line with accessible polity as defined
by Archer. 
Institutional memory and institutional culture: problems and
challenges 
The impenetrable polity of the new DoE not only found expression in
the continued operation of the old apartheid structure and the incum-
bency of the old bureaucracy, but also in the institutional culture of the
apartheid system that continued to be the basis on which the daily
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business of the Department was carried out. This institutional culture
could be referred to as the invisible expression of the closure of the
system. The use of the concept of closure of the political system is not
only related to the centralisation of power in the hands of a few peo-
ple, it also has to do with the institutional cultures that characterised
the operations of the DoE. It addresses the extent to which these
institutional cultures were open to change and had to be transformed.
Thus the transformation of this institutional culture to make it more
open and, in line with the values and principles of the new govern-
ment, was one of the challenges facing the new Ministry of Education.
Given the nature of these challenges, it had problems in translating the
old structures and cultures into what might become levers or organs of
state power. 
The creation of the new institutional culture was informed by the
new vision but also drew from the backgrounds of the individuals and
from their individual memories. Thus in drawing from the back-
grounds of the individuals that make up the department, one is draw-
ing on their memories, skills and experiences. This process of creating
the new culture was not linear but drew on various sources, including
the individual memories of the new appointees. In some cases those
memories were new to the system and not even integrated, they had
not gone through the 'melting pot' process where individual memories
would be merged into the new memory of the state. 
Institutional culture drew from a number of variants, such as
institutional memory and the personalities employed within the depart-
ment. By institutional memory is meant the background that indivi-
duals bring to the context. It has to do with the past and what they can
remember. It is an established form of practice and draws from the
principles, values and norms that inform it. It influences the way
things are done. The challenge is how to draw on this (institutional
memory) in a way that shapes the present and future institutional
culture. Attaining this transformation required a number of steps. First
there was a need to create an institutional culture and to identify the
levers of state that needed to be brought under control in order to
accelerate the pace of change. Mseleku explains institutional culture
as
How people go about doing things, the systems, the operations,
and the procedures for doing basic things, what leads to the deve-
lopment of those systems and what is it that they were actually
trying to create, what were their objectives for creating all those
things. Without understanding them or without having somebody
who understood what this system was meant to do, you weren't
able to actually break into it because you need to understand the
dynamics of the system in order to know where to change it
(Mseleku, interview).
In organisational change, a primary step is to understand the nature of
the organisation and the key dimensions in it. Rensburg elaborated on
the notion of institutional culture by relating it to
Policies and laws which are a formal representation of the memo-
ry, ideas, vision, mission, values, and frameworks for change, of
the strategies for change, objectives, and of the implementation
strategies attached to those objectives. And so someone has to
write it, or groups of people have to write it (Rensburg, inter-
view).
The challenge was to create an environment that was conducive to the
expression of these backgrounds and memories in order to lay a basis
for the establishment of an institutional culture that would inform the
new institutional practices and new policy development.
There are different levels through which institutional memory
mediates new practices and the development of a new institutional
culture. The first level is of senior public servants (bureaucrats) who
express it through ideas, mediate it through interpretation, give mea-
ning to it and implement it on the basis of their own weaknesses and
strengths. The next level of mediation is the institutions themselves,
according to their capacity to respond to policy that has been selected
from a range of options. The policy process and the implementation
itself involve interpreting this memory. The new policies and laws
were developed, written, understood and implemented by bureaucrats
and the public. They were not just written; they were also mediated.
Institutional culture finds expression in two forms. The first is
through ideas expressed by the senior bureaucracy and the institutions
that interact with policy. The second form is through official docu-
ments of the DoE. These are formal representations of the state in
terms of various policy domains. The creation of the new institutional
culture in government departments became a contested domain, given
the fact that liberation was not attained through a revolution but
through negotiations. The GNU arrangement forced members of op-
posing camps to work together, even though it was difficult for this to
happen given the history of adversarial relations among members of
the GNU. In reflecting on the impact of coexistence of institutional
cultures within the DoE in the writing of the White Paper 1 on Educa-
tion and Training, Coombe commented that: 
Stakeholder organisations from the past regime were still using
the structures and personnel of the old departments as their con-
duit into the new political dispensation. They were putting their
own views across through the officials from the previous depart-
ments and likewise those officials who were feeding drafts of the
new White Paper through those lobby groups, teacher organi-
sations in order to protect their own familiar base from the pre-
vious dispensation. Those structures were by no means dissolved
through the process of the election and the formation of the new
department. The process within the bureaucracy of the old and
incoming was not simply a bureaucratic process at all, given the
political context. Just as the SMT members were aware that they
had been appointed by Minister Bengu on political grounds, they
were drawn from the political formation of the mass democratic
movement, and they were expected to drive the mass democratic
movement policy agenda and they had a political accountability
to the Minister to the democratic movement structures (Coombe,
interview).
Another feature of creating a new institutional culture was the recruit-
ment of a new crop of bureaucrats who quickly had to drop unrealistic
expectations and face the challenges of state and state power. This
required a realistic understanding of the old bureaucracy and how it
worked in order either to work against it or imbue it with a new style.
Failure to have this sobering kind of experience in order to understand
the nature of bureaucracy, and relying only on the fresher values and
approaches that might have been inappropriate would not have been
relevant for state power. On the other hand, they would have been
appropriate for what Mseleku calls 'an anti-state movement', in other
words, 'they are good for a revolutionary state because their mobili-
sation strategy is not necessarily appropriate in a context of a demo-
cratic state' (Mseleku, interview).
Primacy of skills versus primacy of politics: debates on the role
of the old and the new bureaucracy in the new educational and
policy context
Different views have been expressed concerning the usefulness of re-
lying either on the old or the new bureaucracy in the development of
policy. Arguments in favour of both views have been advanced, which
add to the complexity of creating a new institutional culture. They
range from putting primacy on skills (technical grounds) to putting
primacy on politics. The former sees the problems of the policies de-
veloped in the first five years of the new government as being caused
by a reliance on the new, visionary but inexperienced bureaucrats, at
the expense of the old and experienced. Morris, one of the proponents
of the use of the old bureaucrats, argues that they were not utilised and
in the process were sidelined and became alienated. He highlights their
unused skills in the new context in the following statement:
They [old bureaucrats) actually have all the institutional know-
ledge of how to work something through a system. There are
rules that say how to do this, and everybody knows that if you
want to do it through the system you do it this way and that way
in order to get it through. Those people know all of that; they
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have all the implicit knowledge to do it. If they do not
participate in the process, then you do not know how to
guide things through a particular system. So on the one
hand, it's a lack of capacity by new people coming in with
the correct ideas of policy formula-tion. On the other hand,
people in the institution who don't under-stand what the new
policy is about, but understand the institu-tional
arrangements about how to get it through. So if you don't
create those linkages you have a big problem (Morris,
interview). 
As a result of their alienation some of the old bureaucrats eventually
left the system, thus contributing to the loss of important expertise for
the new government.
From the opposite standpoint, those who put primacy on politics
believed the skills possessed by the old bureaucrats were not appropri-
ate to the new policy context. Elaborating on this view, Mosala point-
ed out that: 
When you drew them (the old bureaucrats) in, they had no under-
standing of the political objectives of the new government. Even
where they did understand they had an ideological difference
with it. They did not have the technical expertise and capacity
that was required to drive the new system. So they were unquali-
fied to be there. They were not suited, not as persons, but they
were not qualified to run with the new policy intentions of the
new government. Their world was just another world. It is not
true that they were not brought in, but they were not useful at all.
They were robots. They were trained in another type of world.
They were used to taking instructions. They refused to think.
That is the bureaucracy the new government could never have
used (Mosala, interview).
This view of the irrelevance of some of some of the skills of old bu-
reaucrats in the new policy context highlights some points about the
nature of the bureaucracy in such centralised and impenetrable polities
as prevailed in the apartheid political system. It could be argued that
the top-down approach used in these polities required a type of bu-
reaucracy that carried out instructions efficiently for the system to run
effectively. The backbone of the old system was an 'efficient' bureau-
cracy that provided its own sustenance over four decades. It could
further be inferred that this type of personnel might have been trained
for the sole purpose of carrying out instructions unquestioningly. Whe-
ther or not such an inference is valid, the appointment of replacements
to build new capacities did not provide instant solutions to the pro-
blems described by Mosala. The new appointees were also found to be
wanting in terms of the management skills that were required to run
the system. In outlining some of the problems Badsha explained that:
We had the challenges of bringing in capacity. At a very basic
practical level it was a case of people coming into the Depart-
ment who had some experience and some sense of the policy pro-
cess but now had to deal with being managers in the public
service where you had to now manage projects and managed pro-
cesses in particular. You had to work in different ways with
agencies like Education Policy Units (EPUs), Center for Educa-
tion Policy Development (CEPD) or whoever you had to now
draw on to take your work further. So where you were before a
researcher yourself, you now had to manage that research process
and guide it and lead it. So that posed new challenges for a lot of
people. I think another challenge people faced was to be able to
find their feet in the bureaucracy. Some people find it more
difficult to leave behind some of their activist background. So
there was a sense of helping people respond now to issues in a
much more realistic way rather than as activists. So it has also
been important to recognise skills gaps of colleagues and help
them to develop those areas (Badsha, interview). 
A third perspective incorporated both views, putting primacy on both
politics and skills. It related the use of the old bureaucrats to a certain
calibre of leadership. Metcalfe argued that:
In terms of utilising the expertise of experienced officials it re-
quired a particular calibre of leadership in order to effectively use
such people. That particular calibre would have been a person
with vision, who was able to hold that vision, communicate that
vision, and get them to use their skills in a very well-managed
way to achieve that vision. That happened infrequently. If you
look at the case histories of the particular sections within the new
bureaucracy what you would more often find is an alienation
between the two with no real leadership in terms of taking people
along, marginalisation of the old guard and constant irritation at
their display of old attitudes without a meaningful engagement or
taking them along. There were relationships which were rooted
much more in suspicion and people who were unable to accept
the new leadership and vision (Metcalfe, interview).
This highlights the different perceptions, assumptions and positions
that prevailed and that posed challenges for the establishment of the
new bureaucracy. These inevitably impacted on the creation of the
new institutional culture necessary for stability within the DoE. The
different perspectives on the role and the use of the old bureaucracy
in the new political context highlight two important points concerning
the bureaucracy in relation to the relative openness and closure of the
system. The first concerns the power the old bureaucracy wielded in
terms of knowledge of the system, which could be used to block the
transformation agenda and hence ensure the continued closure of the
system. The other is related to the relevance of the operational skills
within the system which the old bureaucracy possessed but which
could be used only on the basis of direction and leadership offered
from elsewhere. In this case, the use of these skills had little impact on
determining the openness or closure of the system. 
Some of the ways in which skills have been spoken of show the
heterogeneity required in this context. The views expressed about
them entailed inter alia knowledge of the system, the new policy, the
political objectives of government, managerial skills, technical skills
to drive the new system, thinking skills, leadership, vision and
communication of that vision to the bureaucrats. 
This article subscribes to the view that for the purpose of continu-
ity within the new bureaucracy, a combination of the old and the new
bureaucracy was required in the department. However, this needed to
be drawn from people who were committed to the new vision of go-
vernment and prepared to use their skills or acquire new skills for the
benefit of the new government. 
Creating a new institutional culture also entailed the management
of crisis involved in the transition from the old bureaucratic culture to
the new one. According to Mseleku, the new government was faced
with an old order that did not want to change, but actually wanted to
entrench itself by saying 'we are the institutional memory', and the
new order that was saying 'we cannot trust the old at all and therefore
it has no reason for claim [sic] to an institutional memory' (Mseleku,
interview). The state was faced with contending institutional memories
and cultures, one rooted in the old apartheid bureaucratic order, the
other in the historical struggle against apartheid. The latter had no
history of dealing with formal government bureaucracy. The challenge
for the new state was to identify at what point it had to use the old
institutional memory and at what point to reject it completely and
simply try and create a new institutional culture from scratch. The
interface between the two was actually what the managers had to con-
tend with. Some of these difficulties in dealing with the two insti-
tutional memories in relation to the notion of democracy and parti-
cipation are highlighted by the Director-General of Education in the
following statement:
You have a situation where participation in democracy is what
you want to come with, but the institutional memory that exists
tells you that you cannot go and discuss with the structures and
the people out there your intentions as government before they
have been approved by democratic structures of government. So
you are frustrated because you believe that in the policy develop-
ment stage that the principle of democracy which is participatory
is quite critical and crucial. Yet the institutional memory which
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exists tells you that 'to do that is to undermine your power
as go-vernment because you would actually have sold your
position. You cannot do this without losing your authority
as government' (Mseleku, interview).
The challenge facing the managers within the DoE was how to deal
with these two cultures without abandoning the principle of democra-
cy, and how ultimately to forge the new institutional culture. Msele-
ku's response here reveals the tension and the struggle that charac-
terised the transition from the closed and impenetrable polity to the
open and accessible polity the new government was committed to. The
new bureaucracy was made up of people from different backgrounds,
political persuasions and ideological orientations. According to Mosa-
la, the coexistence of such diversity did not impact on policy formu-
lation, but on implementation. This could be related to the period in
the early days of the establishment of the DoE when it mainly outsour-
ced the development of higher education policy and only senior go-
vernment officials were involved in the final stages of policy deve-
lopment. This outsourcing could be related to the lack of human re-
source capacity to deal with the demands being made on the bu-
reaucracy within the DoE. However, it also opened a window of
opportunity for the public or stakeholders, other than the bureaucracy,
to participate in the policy development process, thereby democra-
tising it and making it more accessible. 
The situation of having the old and the new bureaucracy working
together in pursuit of the government's new vision for education raises
the question of what measures were put in place to prepare or reorient
the bureaucracy so as to be able to operate under these new conditions.
There does not seem to be any evidence of such support being put in
place. Whilst the new bureaucracy was lacking in a full understanding
of how large organisations operated and how to change them, the
challenge lay in getting the old bureaucrats to understand where go-
vernment and the new policies were trying to go. Mosala expressed
this challenge in conspiratorial terms:
The language of the new policies was another world to most peo-
ple and they didn't identify with that world. In fact, at other times
I had the distinct impression that those people worked against
what we were trying to do, consciously or unconsciously. For
example, when we were deciding whether or not we were going
to continue to have the Committee of Technikon Principals and
the Committee of University Principals as statutory bodies, those
people [the old bureaucrats] were working together with techni-
kons and universities to try and force us to maintain the statutory
status of those bodies. Many a time they were in cahoots with the
sector (higher education) against the Department in trying to push
the line of the sector which was predominantly status quo tradi-
tional white old guard sector at the time (Mosala, interview).
Here expression of the frustrations and contestations entailed in the
creation of a new institutional culture reveal part of the struggle in-
volved. It could be mediated only through sophisticated staff recruit-
ment, writing of policies and provision of leadership. Against these
were the limitations of appointing too few people within the DoE  with
the desire or ability to attempt transformation. For the process to
succeed, more people were needed who shared the same vision and
would be prepared to work in new ways to achieve it. 
More broadly than the details of recruitment, creating a new insti-
tutional culture would have to entail putting in place a new conception
of democracy. Not only would the right human resources have to be
found; their effective mobilisation would require matching them with
the appropriate responsibilities. This called for the establishment of
systems and processes of finance, procurement, workflow and decision
making across a range of specialised areas. There was no escaping the
fact that some of these skills were found within the old bureaucracy
and again this reinforced the notion of their indispensability within
many departments, including the DoE. Even though there was a need
for change to be effected, it did not mean that everything had to
change. The key to creating continuity lay in balancing the bureau-
cratic skills of the old with a willingness to pass them down to the
new.
One illustration of the complexity involved in this balancing act
involved a chief education specialist who had served the apartheid
DoE for thirteen years and reached retirement age even before 1994.
Mr H Davies was retained by the DoE because he was the only person
who understood the Technikon funding formula. He continued to serve
as consultant for the Department in this field thus maintaining an ele-
ment of continuity with the old guard. By 1999, a number of other se-
nior officials (old and new) of the DoE who had served in the first five
years and left, had been retained as consultants. Even though this
practice could be viewed with scepticism, given the cost of using con-
sultants, it does, however, point to a perceived difficulty in substitu-
ting experience. 
A particularly sinister aspect of the institutional culture of the old
bureaucracy of apartheid was the need to guard against enemies.
Whether collectively from outside the country, or individually from
within, the government was under constant attack. Even, perhaps espe-
cially, the ministers were not safe, and ranged amongst their most ob-
structive opponents were the bureaucrats. What the Director-General
colloquially refers to below, as 'covering the Minister or Director-
General's back' could be translated formally as loyalty. Or it could
reveal something more profound about the culture of apartheid. As
Mseleku explained:
Mainly all the practices here were based on this main principle of
covering the Minister or Director General's (DG's) back. How
does it translate itself? No one, for example, could speak to the
press, could write a letter or anything on behalf of this Depart-
ment, could do anything without the consent of people who were
on top because it was important to cover the Minister's back or
the DG's back. And the culture that existed in decision making
among the people from the director level was to push paper arti-
cle upwards. The locus of decision making was centred at the top,
(and was) very closed (Mseleku, interview). 
To change such a culture of paranoia and subservience and put in a
system that was both vertical and horizontal in decision making was
something the DoE had to do urgently. It meant no less than putting
in place what the Director-General refers to as a new culture of de-
mocracy. In Archer's terms it would mean opening up the system. This
entailed establishing the new rules and procedures for decision ma-
king. In line with the principles of transparency, democracy, and ac-
countability, which the new government had committed itself to, the
new culture that was forged in the department was, according to
Mseleku, not about protecting the Director-General or the Minister,
but about facilitating delivery. What is not clear is whether giving up
protection for the Minister also meant giving up loyalty. Would al-
lowing Departmental officials to go out and do their work lead in the
process to their making mistakes? Obviously making mistakes was not
encouraged but the significance lay in what was intended when the
mistakes were made. As Mseleku put it:
The culture was that the DG would cover your back rather than
you covering his. It allowed people to experiment and be creative
as long as they operated within the established parameters (Mse-
leku, interview). 
Although past practices discouraged Departmental officials from talk-
ing to the public without authorisation, Davies rightly argues that this
was still the practice within the new DoE (Davies, interview). Even
though it was cultivating a culture of democracy for itself, it did not
necessarily mean that any official could go out and say anything on
behalf of the Department without authorisation. An incident described
by Mosala, in which he was castigated for speaking to the press with-
out formal authorisation, illustrates this point succinctly:  
The new appointees, particularly blacks, that came in, suffered
from an inferiority complex of not having worked in government
before and fitted into what they found, in an uncritical way, and
as the way government works. We were told all the time by the
people who were there that 'this is what you do and this is how
you do it'. The first problem I had in the Department was I gave
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an interview to a newspaper, the Business Day, on the
indicative funding figures for higher education. My
colleagues who were all white at that time felt that the rule
and the tradition was that we don't divulge that information
until April the following year after the Minister has made
the budget speech (Mosala, interview).
Mosala argued that in his view, universities, technikons and the public
were awaiting these figures to help in their planning. Since he knew
them and explained that these figures were only indicative and not yet
approved by cabinet, he found no problem in divulging them. But, as
he explained:
I got into such trouble about that because these people then told
the Minister and the Director-General who then wanted to know
who divulged this information. And people were surprised that I
did it, and I said 'Why can't I'? And they said 'no, it is not done'.
'But who was saying it is not done?' The old guard. 'But why
shouldn't it be done?' I asked (Mosala, interview). 
The incident landed Mosala in trouble within the DoE, with the Minis-
ter not endorsing his action. The practice was for these figures to be
divulged only after planning had been endorsed by parliament. How-
ever, in Mosala's view, they were still the figures that were to be
worked with. By the time parliament endorsed them in March, major
political decisions would already have been made by the councils of
higher education institutions. Mosala viewed this veil of secrecy as
unhelpful. 
Mosala's experience highlights three important features of the
DoE at the time. Firstly, it indicates the inadequacies and ineffective-
ness of the new bureaucracy in the new context. There seems to have
been some inflexibility about allowing new ways of doing things. Se-
condly, the lack of transformation was similar to the process that had
existed in the old days. In Mosala's view, the functioning and work-
ings of the Department should have been completely reconceptualised
and redesigned so that the new people could come in with new ideas
and that the departments could be made to respond more timeously.
Thirdly, it shows the continuation of the old institutional cultural hege-
mony in a new context. As a final point to be made from the incident,
contrary to the view that the Minister or Director-General would cover
the staffs' back, Mosala was expected to cover the Department by not
divulging funding figures. This demonstrates the closure of the system
in terms of decision making and access to information. 
This account shows that there was a fresh ethos and, as far as
South Africa was concerned, unprecedented democratic practices that
the DoE had to forge. They were not to be served up on a plate but
contested, negotiated and, in the rhetoric of the time, struggled over.
As Mseleku put it, 'democracy is actually people, culture, thinking,
approaches, processes, everything that you find in a government
Department. That's a democracy' (Mseleku, interview). This definition
may appear simplistic and may fail to draw on the insights provided
earlier in terms of the different discourses and people coexisting with-
in the Department. To say 'democracy is people' is not enough. The
question then for government was what  kind  of  people do you have
and what kind of practices do you have in place? Democracy could be
defined in terms of the kinds of people, cultures, processes and ap-
proaches that were supposedly being established in the Department.
However, as pointed out earlier, what might be thought of as democra-
cy by some people may be regarded as a weakness by others. 
Conclusion 
This article has analysed the creation of the DoE in terms of the chal-
lenges entailed. Using the concepts of closure and openness of polity,
it has argued that the creation of the DoE was characterised by a strug-
gle to shift from the impenetrable polity which had taken root in the
institutional culture and memories of the old bureaucrats held sway
during the continued employment of the old civil servants for the first
five year of the new government. The goal was an accessible polity
that would employ new people and institute new ways of doing things.
For a number of reasons enumerated above, including a global move
away from the associated ideologies, radical revolution was not an
option. Rather, the choice lay in various forms of restructuring old
apartheid structures — dismantling some, amalgamating others. To
create the new education system envisaged by the African National
Congress activists would have required a very different culture within
the DoE. Whilst the appointment of new people accompanied by re-
tention of the old gave an element of continuity to government, and
therefore arguably some stability to the process of transition, the so-
called 'sunset clause' in the Interim Constitution which guaranteed the
jobs of old bureacracrts for at least five years, also impeded progress
in implementing changes in line with the vision of the new govern-
ment. 
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